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One hundred years ago, on July 4, 1889, seventy-five dele-
gates from Washington Territory met in Olympia to frame a
constitution for the State of Washington. Seven weeks later,
on August 22, 1889, a constitution had been drafted. By Octo-
ber 1, 1889, the people of Washington had ratified the constitu-
tion and on November 11, 1889, Washington was admitted to
the Union as the forty-second state.
One hundred years later, even though this constitution has
been amended eighty-two times, we celebrate the vision of the
framers who gave the people of Washington a living, vibrant
document that still provides the basic framework of govern-
ment for the state. The purpose of this Article is to provide a
greater awareness of how portions of the Washington Constitu-
tion were drafted in 1889 and how they since have been applied
and interpreted.'
* Justice, Washington Supreme Court. B.A., 1949, Swarthmore College; LL.B.
1952, University of Washington. The author expresses special thanks to William L.
Davidson, a second-year law student at the University of Minnesota Law School, and
Jessica G. Porter, a member of the Washington State Bar, for their contributions to
this Article; and to Joan Dolman, his administrative assistant, for her help in
preparing the manuscript.
1. This Article continues the well-established tradition of examining and focusing
upon state constitutions. See, e.g., Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Symposium: The Emergence of State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REV. 959-1375 (1985); Utter, Freedom and Diversity in
a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington
Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 491 (1983) [hereinafter Utter];
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As part of the commemoration of Washington's centennial,
this Article will examine three parts of the Washington Consti-
tution written and adopted in 1889: article I, section 16,2 the
taking clause; article VIII, section 7,3 the municipal credit
clause; and article XII, sections 1-22,4 the Corporations Article.
Each of these three provisions provides a different per-
spective on the draftsmanship and interpretation of constitu-
tional language. Washington's taking clause is an example of a
universal and traditional constitutional provision. The munici-
pal credit clause shows the difficulties of applying constitu-
tional language to new circumstances and situations
inconceivable to the framers. The Corporations Article
reflects language that essentially attempts to legislate, or cod-
ify in the constitution, restrictions on corporations, trusts, and
railroads.
This Article will attempt to identify and explain the fun-
damental premises behind each of the three parts by consider-
ing the constitutional text, the specific intent of the framers
where discoverable, the climate of the times in the territory
and nation in 1889, and the judicial gloss from early case law.
Additionally, given these considerations, this Article will
Collins, Forward Reliance on State Constitutions-Beyond the "New Federalism," 8 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. vi (Winter, 1984-85).
2. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16.
Eminent Domain. Private Property shall not be taken for private use, except
for private ways of necessity, and for drains, flumes, or ditches on or across
the lands of others for agricultural, domestic, or sanitary purposes. No private
property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just
compensation having first been made, or paid into court for the owner, and no
right-of-way shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation other than
municipal until full compensation therefore be first made in money, or
ascertained and paid into court for the owner, irrespective of any benefit from
any improvement proposed by such corporation, which compensation shall be
ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived, as in other civil cases in courts
of record, in the manner prescribed by law. Whenever an attempt is made to
take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the
contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and determined
without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public.
Id.
3. WAsH. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.
Credit not to be loaned. No county, city, town, or other municipal corporation
shall hereafter give money or other property, or loan its money, or credit to or
in aid of any individual, association, company or corporation, except for the
necessary support of the poor and infirm, or become directly or indirectly the
owner of any stock in or bonds of any association, company or corporation.
Id.
4. See infra note 183 for portions of article XII.
19891 The Washington Constitution
explore how faithfully the decisions of the Washington
Supreme Court have applied the framers' premises.
Constitutional interpretation, especially when involving
ambiguous or arcane provisions, is difficult and controversial.5
The difficulty increases when the constitution must be applied
to conditions that could never have been foreseen when the
constitution was drafted and adopted. Yet the interpretation of
constitutions, among other documents, is precisely what judges
are daily called upon to do.
Constitutional interpretation is similar to the interpreta-
tion of any other document, and four major factors must be
considered.' First, the actual text of the constitution itself
must be examined.7 The meaning of the words themselves
provide an excellent start, and often an end, to any interpre-
tive dispute. However, open-textured clauses8 or meanings of
words that have changed over time require that the other fac-
tors of interpretation be considered in order properly to apply
5. Many different theories and views on constitutional interpretation exist. See
generally 3 ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 23 (1986); Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S.
TEx. L.J. 383 (1985); Ely, Constitutional Interpretivismr: Its Allure and Impossibility,
53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978); Schlag, Framers' Intent: The Illegitimate Uses of History, 8 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 283 (1985); B. Neuborne, The Origin of Rights:
Constitutionalism, the Stork and the Democratic Dilemma-A Working Paper for
Delivery in Connection with the Bicentennial of the Constitution at the Smithsonian
Institution (1987); State ex rel. Graham v. Olympia, 80 Wash. 2d 672, 685, 497 P.2d 924,
931 (1972) (Finley, J., concurring specially) (identifying two methods of constitutional
interpretation: liberal or functional and literal or "strict constructionist"); Anderson v.
Chapman, 86 Wash. 2d 189, 196-98, 543 P.2d 229, 233-34 (1975) (Finley, J., dissenting)
(same).
6. Cf. Utter, supra note 1, at 508-24.
7. Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention, 100 HARv. L.
REV. 751, 756-60 (1987). As a counterpoint to Fried, see POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE
266-68 (1988).
8. An excellent example of the differences between open-textured and close-
textured language appears in the same article of the United States Constitution. In
article II, § 1, the United States Constitution requires the President to "have attained
to the age of thirty-five years," while elsewhere requiring the President to be a
"natural born citizen." U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1. The language, "thirty-five years," is an
example of completely closed-textured language, while "natural born" is somewhat
open-textured and requires some historical knowledge to determine, for example, if
illegitimacy, Caesarean birth, or birth abroad to parents who were American citizens
would bar eligibility for the presidency. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivismr" Its Allure
and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 413-15 (1978); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 207 (1980). For a more tendentious view
of the presidential age provision, see Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1173-75 (1985); Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in
Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 686-88 (1985).
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a constitutional section to a given contemporary factual
situation.
Second, analysis of specific constitutional provisions
requires consideration of the intent of the framers. The con-
troversy over constitutional interpretation has reached its
highest levels over this issue of "framers' intent." While many
commentators condemn the use of, or dispute the existence or
discoverability of framers' intent,9 at a minimum, an examina-
tion of this intent is helpful.
Third, the atmosphere or temper of the times surrounding
the constitutional convention must be considered. The
problems facing constitutional delegates, and the methods cho-
sen to address them, may reveal much and may be immensely
helpful in future applications of constitutional provisions. In
order to discover the general intent or fundamental premise of
the framers behind each provision, an understanding of the
political, social, and economic environment of 1889 is crucial.1"
This Article will attempt to discover the then-existing intellec-
tual environment and gauge its impact on the language drafted
by the framers in 1889. The Article's focus will be on broad
themes existing in the territory and nation, as well as the spe-
cific history behind each of the three provisions, but is not
intended to provide a comprehensive history of Washington
Territory and the 1889 Constitutional Convention.1 1
9. See, e.g., Brest, the Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U.L. REV. 204, 209-17 (1980); C. DUCAT, MODES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
103 (1978) (observing "the framers, after all, are dead, and in the contemporary world,
their views are neither relevant nor morally binding"), cited by Fried, Sonnet LXV
and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention, 100 HARV. L. REV. 751, 755 n.22 (1987);
Schlag, Framers' Intent: The Illegitimate Uses of History, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
283, 284 n.4 (1985).
10. See Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wash. 2d 286, 291, 347 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1959) ("In
determining the meaning of a constitutional provision, the intent of the framers, and
the history of events and proceedings contemporaneous with its adoption may properly
be considered."); Bowen v. Dept. of Social Security, 14 Wash. 2d 148, 150-51, 127 P.2d
682, 684 (1942) (citing COOLEY ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 133 (8th ed. 1927);
People v. Harding, 53 Mich. 481, 485, 19 N.W. 155, 156 (Cooley, C.J.)); Sears v. Western
Thrift Stores, 10 Wash. 2d 372, 382, 116 P.2d 756, 761 (1941) (overruled by Remington
Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 55 Wash. 2d 1, 345 P.2d 1085 (1959)); State ex rel. Mason County
Logging Co. v. Willey, 177 Wash. 65, 73-74, 31 P.2d 539, 543 (1934).
11. For specific histories of Washington Territory and the 1889 Constitutional
Convention, see generally W. Airey, A History of the Constitution and Government of
Washington Territory (1945) (unpublished thesis available in Washington State Law
Library) [hereinafter Airey]; J. Fitts, The Washington Constitutional Convention of
1889 (1951) (unpublished thesis available in Washington State Law Library)
[hereinafter Fitts].
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One of the best sources from which to learn of the intel-
lectual environment surrounding constitutional delegates
would be a transcript of a convention's proceedings, which
records the delegates' debates, voting records, and overall atti-
tudes.12 Unfortunately, such detailed records of the Washing-
ton Convention have not survived.13  However, it remains
possible to determine the underlying assumptions of the fram-
ers, given the existing secondary records from the conven-
tion. 4 Writings completed after the convention by former
delegates are also useful.'
A fourth factor to consider in constitutional interpretation
is that it may be influenced by the judicial gloss placed on the
framers' words by earlier courts construing the same or similar
12. This was recognized early in Washington by Lieutenant Governor Charles E.
Laughton, acting governor in 1891, when he urged the legislature to appropriate funds
to print the stenographic records of the convention. He states: 'They will throw a
flood of light upon the intent of the framers of the Constitution, and thus aid
materially in giving a correct interpretation to provisions whose meaning may not be
free from doubt." Message of Charles E. Laughton, Lieutenant Governor and Acting
Governor to the Legislature of 1891, at 37 (Olympia, 1891), cited in Crawford, Grange
Attitudes in Washington, 30 PAC. N.W. Q. 243, 250 n.18 (1939) [hereinafter Crawford].
13. The record of the Washington Constitutional Convention was destroyed. See
B. ROSENOW, THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
1869, at vii (1962) [hereinafter ROSENOW JOURNAL].
14. See, e.g., ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13. In addition, the following
newspapers, among others, contain reports on the constitutional convention:
Anacortes Progress, Asotin Sentinel, Chehalis Bee, Chehalis Nugget, Colfax Palouse
Gazette, Daily Oregon Statesman, Morning Oregonian (Portland), New York Times,
New York Tribune, Oregon Statesman (Salem), Portland Evening Telegram, Puget
Sound Weekly Argus (Port Townsend), Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Seattle Times,
Spokane Falls Northwest Tribune, Spokane Falls Review, Tacoma Daily Ledger,
Territorial Republican (Olympia), Vancouver Independent, Walla Walla Weekly
Statesman, Walla Walla Weekly Union, Washington Standard (Olympia), Yakima
Herald. Most of these papers are available through the University of Washington Law
Library, 2 B. Rosenow, Working Papers For the Journal of the Washington State
Constitutional Convention, 1889 (contemporary newspaper articles), or through the
Washington State Library Washington Room.
15. Kinnear, Notes on the Constitutional Convention, 4 WASH. HIST. Q. 276 (1913)
(delegate to the 1889 Constitutional Convention) [hereinafter Kinnear]; Stiles, The
Constitution of the State and its Effects Upon Public Interests, 4 WASH. HIST. Q. 281
(1913) (delegate to the 1889 Constitutional Convehtion and former Washington
Supreme Court Judge) [hereinafter Stiles] (republished from Tacoma Daily Ledger,
Nov. 11, 1897); E. MEANY, HISTORY OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 288 (1937)).
Three of the first five judges of the Washington Supreme Court were delegates to
the convention: T.L. Stiles, John P. Hoyt, and R.O. Dunbar. Their early opinions may
be helpful in understanding the views of the framers during the convention. But see
Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 508-09, 585 P.2d 71, 89-90 (1978)
(the fact that three judges were convention delegates merits no special consideration
nor does it provide any insight into separation of power issue at hand; yet the court
later cited with approval T. L. Stiles' article reprinted in 1913).
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constitutional provisions. Constitutional interpretation based
upon the language used, the specific intent of the framers, the
climate of the times, and the problems facing the framers can
certainly be aided by the gloss of earlier judicial writers.
By far the most difficult and important part of interpreta-
tion is applying the constitutional language to contemporary
factual problems never considered or imagined when the con-
stitution was drafted. These situations require a transposition
of the language, purposes, and intent of the constitution from
the time it was drafted and ratified, to the conditions of
today.
16
This Article will begin with a general historical overview
of the 1889 convention, and continue with more specific histo-
ries of the adoption of the taking clause, municipal credit
clause, and the Corporations Article. An analysis of each of
the constitutional provisions follows this historical background.
Finally, this Article will assess how faithfully the Washington
Supreme Court has applied the constitutional language.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Following years of attempts by Washington and the other
territories to gain statehood, 7 Congress passed the Enabling
Act, which granted the authority to call constitutional conven-
tions.' 8 On July 4, 1889, the Washington Constitutional Con-
vention convened in Olympia, Washington, joining four other
territories seeking to attain statehood. Washington, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana held constitutional con-
ventions under the authority of the Enabling Act, which
allowed each to "form constitutions and State governments
16. See Utter, supra note 1, at 521-24. See also State ex rel. Evans v. Brotherhood
of Friends, 41 Wash. 2d 133, 147, 247 P.2d 787, 795-96 (1952) ("constitutional provisions
should be interpreted to meet and cover changing conditions of social and economic
life"); State ex rel. Linn v. Superior Court, 20 Wash. 2d 138, 145-46, 146 P.2d 543, 547
(1944); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 516-17, 585 P.2d 71, 94
(1978).
Other Washington cases express the contrary view that constitutions should be
consistently construed over time or have had their meanings fixed at the time of
ratification, or that changing circumstances do not justify new interpretations. See
State ex rel. Munro v. Todd, 69 Wash. 2d 209, 214, 417 P.2d 955, 958 (1966); State ex rel.
Lemon v. Langlie, 45 Wash. 2d 82, 110, 273 P.2d 464, 479 (1954); Boeing Aircraft Corp.
v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 25 Wash. 2d 652, 658, 171 P.2d 838, 842 (1946); State ex
rel. Banker v. Clausen, 142 Wash. 450, 454, 253 P. 805, 807 (1927).
17. See J. D. HICKS, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE NORTHWEST STATES 19-21
(reprinted from 23 U. NEBRASKA U. STUD. (1923)) [hereinafter HICKS].
18. Id. at 21-25.
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and ... be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with
the Original States." 19 Idaho also convened a constitutional
convention on July 4, 1889, in the hope of attaining statehood.20
All five states succeeded in gaining admission to the Union.2 '
Under the authority and guidance of the Enabling Act, the
people of Washington Territory elected delegates representing
twenty-five territorial districts to draft Washington's Constitu-
tion in the spring of 1889.2
The Act ensured minority representation by limiting vot-
ers to voting for only two delegates in their district.2' Thus,
while a strong Republican majority existed at the convention,
over one-third of the delegates were Democrats.24 And, despite
the majority, several Democrats chaired a number of the con-
vention committees. 25 Although facing a difficult task, the con-
19. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, reprinted in 1987-88 WASHINGTON
LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 41 (1987) [hereinafter "Enabling Act"].
20. Two months later in September of 1889, Wyoming, as did Idaho, convened a
constitutional convention without congressional authorization. HICKS, supra note 17,
at 26.
21. Id. at 148-49. The four previously authorized convention territories, North and
South Dakota, Montana, and Washington, were admitted in November, 1889. Idaho
and Wyoming were admitted as states in July, 1890. Id.
22. Enabling Act, supra note 19, § 3; Airey, supra note 11, at 440; Fitts, supra note
11, at 8.
23. "[I]n each of which districts three delegates shall be elected, but no elector
shall vote for more than two persons for delegates to such convention .... Enabling
Act, supra note 19, § 3; Airey, supra note 11, at 440; Fitts, supra note 11, at 8.
24. The sources vary slightly in the number of delegates from each party. Airey
states that 43 Republicans, 28 Democrats, 2 Independents, and 2 Labor delegates
attended. Airey, supra note 11, at 440-42. Fitts states that 44 Republicans and 28
Democrats attended. Fitts, supra note 11, at 13. In the forward to the ROSENOW
JOURNAL, Professor Gates states that 43 Republican, 29 Democrat, and 3 Independent
delegates attended the convention. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at v. Hicks lists
the count as 43 Republicans, 26 Democrats, 4 Labor, and 2 Independent delegates.
HicKs, supra note 17, at 29. Austin Mires, a convention delegate, states that the
convention consisted of 43 Republicans, 29 Democrats (counting a seat belonging to Dr.
J.J. Travis that was occupied for 6 days by W.W. Waltman), 2 Independents claiming to
be Republicans (S.G. Cosgrove and J.J. Weisenburger), and 2 Labor delegates (M.J.
McElroy and W.L. Newton). Mires, Remarks on the Constitution of the State of
Washington, 22 WASH. HIST. Q. 276, 279 (1931).
25. Democrats chaired 7 of the 26 standing committees at the convention. The
standing committees of the Convention, with the chair and his political party
affiliation listed, were:
1. Preamble and Bill of Rights, Warner, Democrat
2. Elections and Elective Rights, P.C. Sullivan, Republican
3. Legislative Department, J.Z. Moore, Rep.
4. Executive Department and Pardoning Power, Weir, Rep.
5. Judicial Department, Turner, Rep.
6. Military Affairs, Prosser, Rep.
7. State, County and Municipal Indebtedness, Browne, Dem.
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vention delegates were not without guidance in their attempt
to draft a constitution. In addition to the constitutions of
existing states, among which California and Oregon were most
influential,26 the convention delegates also looked to, and
relied upon, the Hill Constitution27 and the Washington Con-
stitution of 1878.28
The convention delegates who met in the various states in
1889 reflected, to varying degrees, the growing populism of the
1880s and 1890s in the nation. Throughout the country, fears
of corrupt government and large corporations increased, and
many recognized a need and called for some type of reform.'
8. Education and Educational Institutions, Blalock, Dem.
9. State Institutions and Public Buildings, T.M. Reed, Rep.
10. County, City and Township Organization, Stiles, Rep.
11. Apportionment and Representation, Crowley, Rep.
12. Revenue and Taxation, Gowey, Rep.
13. Corporations Other Than Municipal, Kinnear, Rep.
14. Miscellaneous Subjects, Schedule and Future Amendment, Sharpstein,
Dem.
15. Revision, Adjustment and Enrollment, Minor, Rep.
16. Water and Water Rights, Mires, Rep.
17. Agriculture, Manufactures, Fisheries and Commerce, E.H. Sullivan,
Rep.
18. Mining and Mining Interests, Manly, Rep.
19. Printing, Mileage and Contingent Expense, Power, Rep.
20. Harbors, Tidewaters and Navigable Streams, Durie, Dem.
21. Homestead and Property Exemptions, Godman, Dem.
22. State, School and Granted Lands, Dunbar, Rep.
23. Federal Relations, Boundaries and Immigration, Comegys, Rep.
24. Engrossment, Shoudy, Rep.
25. State Medical and Public Health, Willison, Dem.
26. Rules of Order, Prosser, Rep.
ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 19-20, 22-23, 37.
26. A. Beardsley, Sources of the Washington State Constitution, reprinted in 1987-
88 WASHINGTON LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 362 (1987) [hereinafter Beardsley].
27. The Hill Constitution was a model constitution prepared by W. Lair Hill, a
prominent attorney of Oregon and California, code writer of Oregon, former editor of
the Portland Oregonian, resident of Seattle, and compiler of Washington's first code.
Hill's draft of a model state constitution was at the request of the Portland Oregonian
and was published in the paper and available to the delegates. Id. at 361-63. See also
ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at v; Fitts, supra note 11, at 21-22.
28. Beardsley, supra note 26, at 363. Washington Territory's first constitutional
convention was held in Walla Walla in June, 1878. See generally Airey, supra note 11.
29. See generally Washington Standard, Sept. 21, 1888, at 1, cols. 4-6 (reprinting
General Benjamin Harrison's acceptance letter of the Republican presidential
nomination which remarked on the need to control trusts and prevent election frauds);
HICKS, supra note 17, at 30-32, 38-54, 90; Deutsch, A Prospectus for the Study of the
Governments of the Pacifc Northwest States in Their Regional Setting, 42 PAC. N.W.
Q. 277, 283-84 (1951) [hereinafter Deutsch]; J. GARRATY, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH
1877-1900, at 302-04, 311-12 (1968); S. CASHMAN, AMERICA IN THE GILDED AGE 283-301
(1984).
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In Washington Territory, the delegates and people
expressed concern over the abuse of public offices; the use of
public funds for private purposes; the concentration of power,
both in and out of government; and the protection of individual
liberties.30 Even so, many delegates and citizens recognized a
need to provide flexibility and freedom for future government
decision makers, and a need for business investments to help
build the new state.31
III. TAKING CLAUSE
Article I, section 16 of the Declaration of Rights sets out
Washington's version of the basic, and almost universal, consti-
tutional provision limiting the sovereign's exercise of eminent
domain power.32 Although some discussion over this section's
language did occur, little about this section can be discovered
directly from the convention journal or contemporary newspa-
pers because debate was relatively limited. Much can be
learned, however, from a basic constitutional understanding of
the times, other state constitutions on which the Washington
Constitution was based, and early Washington Supreme Court
decisions.
Section 16 of article I originated in a proposition submitted
on July 11, 1889, as part of a proposed Bill of Rights by Dele-
30. See generally Public Utility Dist. No. 1. v. Taxpayers of Snohomish County, 78
Wash. 2d 724, 735, 479 P.2d 61, 67 (1971) (Hale, J., dissenting); AVERY, HISTORY AND
GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 318-20 (1961); HicKs, supra note 17, at 30-
32, 38-60, 90; ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at vi; Fitts, supra note 11, at 9-10, 28-
38, 98; Kinnear, supra note 15, at 279; Knapp, The Origin of the Constitution of the
State of Washington, 4 WASH. HIST. Q. 227, 239-40, 272 (1913) (thesis based on
interviews with delegates to the Washington Constitutional Convention) [hereinafter
Knapp]; Thorpe, Washington and Montana - Have They Made A Mistake In Their
Constitutions?, 20 CENTURY MAGAZINE 504, 505-08 (1890) [hereinafter Thorpe]; Walla
Walla Weekly Union, May 11, 1889, at 2, cols. 3-4.
31. See generally Fitts, supra note 11, at 98; Thorpe, supra note 30, at 505-08;
Yakima Herald, Aug. 1, 1889, at 2, cols. 2-3; Tacoma Daily News, July 29, 1889, at 2, col.
2; Id. July 13, 1889, at 2, col. 1; Tacoma Daily Ledger, July 27, 1889, at 2, col. 3; letter
from The Honorable Eugene Semple to S.R. Fraizer of Seattle, Washington dated Jan.
30, 1889 (State Archive Record Group No. 1N-1-1, Eugene Semple's General Files,
Constitutional Convention).
32. Eminent domain is an inherent power of the sovereign, limited only by the
Constitution. 1 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 1.3 (3d ed. 1985);
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 32.02 (rev. 3d ed. 1983); State ex rel.
Mountain Timber Co. v. Superior Court, 77 Wash. 585, 587, 137 P. 994, 995 (1914);
Miller v. Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 382-83, 378 P.2d 464, 469 (1963). For an excellent
overview of the history of eminent domain generally, see Stoebuck, A General Theory
of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972) [hereinafter Stoebuck]. See supra
note 2 and infra note 48.
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gate Weir. 3  This proposition was referred to the Committee
on Preamble and Bill of Rights. 4 On July 25, the Committee
gave its report.3 5 The report essentially included the text of the
section eventually adopted by the convention, omitting only
the manner of judicial determination of public use and the irri-
gation exception for private property taking.2 6
The Committee of the Whole considered section 16 and
the Declaration of Rights on July 29 and 31.3 Two separate
attempts to eliminate the power to take property for private
ways of necessity were handily defeated a.3  A separate motion
to strike the words "other than municipal" was defeated by a
vote of twenty-five to sixteen. 9 Both the meaning behind the
inclusion of the words "other than municipal" and the rejec-
tion of the motion to strike them are unclear,4 ° and the cases
interpreting this part of section 16 are arguably contrary to the
intended purpose.41
After initial consideration on July 29 and 31, the Commit-
tee of the Whole referred section 16 and the Declaration of
Rights to the Committee on the Judicial Department.' This
33. "Private property shall not be taken nor damaged for public use without just
compensation therefore." ROSENOW JouRNAL, supra note 13, at 52.
34. Id. at 53, 469-88. The committee consisted of C.H. Warner, a Democrat from
Colfax, a flour miller and lawyer; George Comegys, a Republican from Davenport, an
editor; Francis Henry, a Democrat from Olympia, a lawyer; Owen Hicks, a Democrat
from Tacoma, a lawyer and printer; J.C. Kellogg, a Republican from Seattle, a doctor;
Frank M. Dallan, a Republican from Davenport, a printer and publisher; and Louis
Sohns, a Republican from Vancouver, a barber.
35. Id. at 153-57.
36. Id. at 504.
37. Id. at 190-91, 198-201.
38. The attempts were on July 29 and July 31. Id. at 504-05.
39. Id. at 504-05.
40. At least two possible interpretations exist for the inclusion of the words "other
than municipal" in § 16. The first would be to allow municipal corporations to take
physical possession of condemned land before making actual payment of just
compensation. The second would allow municipal corporations to offset against any
amount of just compensation payment, any benefit the landowner receives from the
public use for which the land was taken. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 89-100 and accompanying text; Stiles, supra note 15, at 282-83.
42. ROSENOW JouRNAL, supra note 13, at 201. The Committee on the Judicial
Department consisted of: George Turner, committee chair, a Republican from
Spokane Falls, a lawyer and judge; R.O. Dunbar, a Republican from Goldendale, a
lawyer; John F. Gowey, a Republican from Olympia, a lawyer; M.M. Godman, a
Democrat from Dayton, a lawyer; Robert Sturdevant, a Republican from Dayton, a
lawyer; Thomas C. Griffits, a Democrat from Spokane Falls; Austin Mires, a
Republican from Ellensburg, a lawyer; B.L. Sharpstein, a Democrat from Walla Walla,
a lawyer; George H. Jones, a Republican from Port Townsend, a lawyer; John R.
Kinnear, a Republican from Seattle, a lawyer; J.J. Weisenburger, an Independent from
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committee added a method to determine whether a taking of
property was actually for a public use, and allowed for the tak-
ing of private property for milling and mining purposes.43 The
Judiciary Committee reported the section out on August 544
and the convention considered section 16, as amended, on
August 6. The convention struck the exception for milling and
mining, and also defeated motions to strike the exception for
irrigation, to leave out any reference to the legislature in the
public use determination, and to strike the words "other than
municipal. 45 The convention finally adopted the section on
August 6.46
Given the language of section 16, the debates, and the
accepted constitutional theories of the day, some framers'
intent is evident. Beyond the traditional and universal intent
to protect private property from being taken by the sovereign
by limiting the power of eminent domain, the framers followed
the lead of many states in seeking also to protect against dam-
age to property short of a complete taking by the sovereign .4
Additional property protection was afforded by providing
for judicial determination of whether a use of property was
actually public.48 This clear rejection of legislative determina-
tions of public use reflected the general attitude that legisla-
tive bodies were to be limited and not completely trusted.49
Whatcom, a lawyer; and D.J. Crowley, a Republican from Walla Walla, a lawyer. Id. at
19, 469-89. Of this group, Dunbar, Stiles, and Hoyt served as three of the original five
supreme court judges, Turner served as a United States Senator, and Gowey as United
States Minister to Japan. Fitts, supra note 11, at 12.
43. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 226-27, 505.
44. Id. at 505.
45. Id. at 265-68.
46. Id. at 268-72.
47. See generally Brown v. Seattle, 5 Wash. 35, 31 P. 313 (1892); Martin v. Port of
Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 317-18, 391 P.2d 540, 546 (1964); McQuILLAN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS, § 32.26 (rev. 3d ed. 1983); 2 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN,
§§ 6.01[3], 6.26-27 (3d ed. 1985); Knapp, supra note 30, at 236; Stoebuck, supra note 32,
at 555; Note, Eminent Domain-Taking and Damaging: Injunction Against Taking
Prior to Payment of Damages- Wandermere Corp. v. State, 79 Wash. 2d 688, 488 P.2d
1088 (1971), 47 WASH. L. REV. 732 (1972); Note, Inverse Condemnation in
Washington-Is the Lid Off Pandora's Box?, 39 WASH. L. REV. 920, 921-24 (1965).
48. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16, supra note 2, states in relevant part:
Whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be
public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a
judicial question, and determined as such without regard to any legislative
assertion that the use is public.
49. See generally HICKS, supra note 17, at 74-75; Knapp, supra note 30, at 228;
Thorpe, supra note 30, at 505-08. Washington convention delegate and later
Washington Supreme Court Judge R.O. Dunbar was quoted, while discussing the
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Finally, the framers appear to have intended that munici-
pal corporations be allowed the ability to appropriate and take
possession of property after completing eminent domain pro-
ceedings, but before actually paying just compensation.5 0
A review of the Washington cases on eminent domain,
with the above premises of the framers in mind, reveals at
least two conflicts. 1 The first involves the clause in section 16
requiring a judicial determination that a proposed use is really
a public use. The second concerns the power of municipal cor-
porations to offset any benefits received by a landowner from a
public use when determining the amount of just compensation
Walla Walla subsidy issue, "if a stranger from a foreign country were to drop into this
convention and hear its deliberations, he would conclude that it had an enemy and
that this enemy was the legislature." Airey, supra note 11, at 484 n.5.
50. Airey, supra note 11, at 456 (citing Stiles, supra note 15, at 282-83). See also
supra note 40.
51. See supra notes 33-50 and accompanying text. In addition, two other conflicts
also may exist. A major change has arguably occurred in court decisions expanding
the meaning of the term "public use." See generally 2A J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN, §§ 7.02[1]-[3] (3d ed. 1985) (narrow view of "public use" as "use by
public" and broad view as "public advantage"). See also 2 ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG,
TREATISE ON CONSTITTrrIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.13 (1986).
Compare Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 501-09, 74 P. 681, 684-85 (1903)
(public use means use by the public or by some quasi-public agency, and is not simply a
use that incidentally or indirectly benefits the public interest or welfare); Miller v.
Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 396-401, 378 P.2d 464, 477-80 (1963) (Rosellini, J., dissenting);
In re Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 627, 638 P.2d 649, 556 (1981) (beneficial uses are not
necessarily public uses) with Miller v. Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 384-88, 378 P.2d 464,
470-73 (1963); In re Port of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 392, 396-97, 495 P.2d 327, 330-31 (1972);
U.S. v. Town of Bonneville, 94 Wash. 2d 827, 833, 621 P.2d 127, 130 (1980) (discussing
changes in definition of public use since Healy while construing WASH. CONST. art. 7,
§ 1); In re Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 635-41, 638 P.2d 549, 560-63 (1981) (Utter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for a broader, liberal view of public use as any public benefit).
An examination of this conflict between the framers' views and judicial
interpretations is beyond the scope of this Article, especially given the lack of clarity
in the definition of the term "public use" in the Washington and other state
constitutions. See 2A J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 7.02 (3d ed. 1985);
State ex rel. Tacoma Industrial Co. v. White River Power Co., 39 Wash. 648, 662, 82 P.
150, 151 (1905) ("public use" is not easily defined); Carstens v. Public Utility Dist. No.
1, 8 Wash. 2d 136, 142, 111 P.2d 583, 586 (1941) (no clear or concise definition of public
use has emerged from innumerable court decisions); King County v. Theilman, 59
Wash. 2d 586, 594, 369 P.2d 503, 507 (1962) ("public use" is not abstractly or historically
capable of complete definition).
Another area of importance which is beyond the scope of this Article is the
confusion concerning the difficulty in distinguishing between eminent domain, tort,
and the police power. See Comment, Distinguishing Eminent Domain From Police
Power and Tort, 38 WASH. L. REV. 607 (1963); Maple Leaf v. Department of Ecology, 88
Wash. 2d 726, 731-35, 565 P.2d 1162, 1164-65 (1977); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 85 Wash. 2d 920, 924, 540 P.2d 1387, 1390 (1975);
Hagen v. Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 218, 221, 339 P.2d 79, 80 (1959); Wong Kee Jun v. Seattle,
143 Wash. 479, 480, 255 P. 645, 646 (1927).
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the municipal corporation must pay. Both involve a deviation
from, and a threat to, the system of government envisioned by
the framers, the first case being more theoretical and the sec-
ond case being more practical.
The judicial determination clause in the Washington Con-
stitution is a clause currently existing in only four other
states.5 2 At the time of the 1889 Washington Convention, only
Colorado and Missouri had similar provisions.5 3 It is not
entirely clear why such a provision was included in Washing-
ton's only constitutional restriction on the sovereign's other-
wise limitless eminent domain power. No journal records or
contemporary newspaper accounts reflect why this provision
was included by the Committee on the Judicial Department
after section 16 was referred to them. The only motion relative
to this provision in the convention was an attempt to strike out
any reference to the legislature.' It failed.5 However, the
clear language of the provision, with its difference from most
other constitutions- and early cases,5  shows that the constitu-
52. See In re Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 627, 638 P.2d 549, 556 (1981); ARIZ. CONST.
art. II, § 17 (adopted 1910); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15 (1875 constitution); MISS. CONST.
art. III, § 17 (adopted 1890); Mo. CONST. art. I, § 28 (adopted 1945, originally adopted
art. II, § 20, 1875 constitution). Oklahoma's Constitution, art. II, § 24 (adopted 1907),
declares that the determination of the character of a use shall be a judicial question,
but does not expressly instruct the court to disregard the assertion of the legislature.
2A J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 7.16[2] (3d ed. 1985). Washington's
judicial determination clause, along with the rest of the Declaration of Rights, was the
source for Arizona's clause and Declaration of Rights. See Leshy, The Making of the
Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1, 82 (1988); Feldman & Abney, The Double
Security of Federalism: Protecting Individual Liberty Under the Arizona
Constitution, 20 ARIz. ST. L.J. 115, 120-21 (1988).
53. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15 (1875 constitution); Mo. CONST. art. I, § 28 (adopted
1945, originally adopted art. II, § 20, 1875 constitution).
54. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 265-66, 505.
55. Id. If the motion to strike out any reference to the legislature had succeeded,
Washington's judicial determination clause would have been identical to Oklahoma's.
Such a clause would have simply stated the interpretation used by other states without
judicial determination clauses, and that, though a public use determination is for the
court, legislative determinations are entitled to great or almost conclusive weight. 2A
J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 7.16[1] (3d ed. 1985).
56. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text; Savannah v. Hancock, 91 Mo. 54,
57, 3 S.W. 215, 216 (1887) (holding, under judicial determination provision, a
constitutional duty of courts to not defer or respect legislative assertions); Denver R.L.
& C. Co. v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 34 F. 386, 388 (C.C. Col. 1888) (questioning whether
presumption in favor of legislative assertions had been removed by inclusion in 1875
constitution of the judicial determination provision). Cf. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 591-93 n.4 (2d ed. 1871) (citing Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Ill. 540; Olmstead
v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532 for view that what is a public use is for the courts, but when a
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tional framers sought to place a limit on the legislature by
assigning the judiciary the duty to determine the character of
proposed public uses."8
One of the first major discussions of this provision
occurred in 1903. In Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris,9 Judge'
Dunbar, a convention delegate and member of the Judicial
Department Committee, wrote an opinion for the court on
whether a public or private purpose was served by a statute
authorizing the condemnation of property. In Healy, the court
explicitly rejected cases from other jurisdictions with different
constitutional language that supported deference to legislative
public use determinations, noting that only Colorado and Mis-
souri had constitutional language similar to Washington."' The
court pointed out that the "constitution has expressly nega-
tived" the idea of giving great weight to legislative pronounce-
ments of public use,62 and that judicial determinations of
public use are to be "untrammeled by any consideration due to
legislative assertion or enactment."' As Judge Dunbar stated,
use is declared public by the legislature, the courts will hold such unless the contrary
clearly appears).
58. See also Jones, Proposed Amendments to the State Constitution of
Washington, 4 WASH. HisT. Q. 12, 13-14 (1913) (discussing attempt in 1905 to amend
art. I, § 16 which would have removed the power from the courts of declaring
additional private uses enumerated in the constitution as not public uses; Washington
voters rejected the proposed amendment in November, 1906, with 15,257 in favor, and
20,984 against). Cf. Wandermere Corp. v. State, 79 Wash. 2d 688, 693, 488 P.2d 1088,
1092 (1971) (judicial determination of public use only required for a taking and not for
damaging).
59. 33 Wash. 490, 74 P. 681 (1903).
60. Washington's Constitution, article IV, refers to "judges" and to the "chief
justice." It was not until the creation of the Washington Court of Appeals in 1969 that
all the members of the high court were designated as "justices." C. SHELDON, A
CENTURY OF JUDGING 229 n.44 (1988) [hereinafter SHELDON]. For an irreverent view of
this matter, see the exchange of letters between John N. Rupp and James M. Dolliver
in WASH. ST. BAR NEWS, Sept., 1979, at 40-42, and WASH. ST. BAR NEWS, Dec., 1979, at
5.
61. 33 Wash. at 499, 74 P. at 682. The opinion failed to mention Mississippi's
similar constitutional provision adopted in 1890, one year after Washington's
Constitutional Convention. See supra note 52. See also In re Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616,
627, 638 P.2d 549, 556 (1981) (noting only Arizona, Colorado, and Missouri have similar
constitutional provisions and rejecting cases from other jurisdictions holding legislative
pronouncements controlling, yet according legislative declarations great weight. Id. at
624-25, 638 P.2d at 555). In re Seattle also failed to mention Mississippi's similar
constitutional provision.
62. Healy, 33 Wash. at 500, 74 P. at 682.
63. Id. But see State ex rel. Tacoma Indust. Co. v. White River Power Co., 39
Wash. 649, 662, 82 P. 150, 151 (1905) (court, in dicta, stating "[uin determining the
question of public use, courts have always been influenced, to a greater or less extent,
by legislative declarations, and by local customs and conditions, and local necessities.").
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in a somewhat self-serving observation, the framers "evidently
deem[ed] it necessary to place a restriction upon legislative
sentiment" concerning the power of eminent domain,' as it
"was no doubt for the purpose of preventing enthusiastic legis-
lation ... that the question of public use was especially submit-
ted to the courts, who are, and should be, ever watchful in
maintaining inviolate the constitutional rights of the citizen. '65
Despite the clear language of section 16 and the Healy
court's recognition of a specific grant of duty to the judiciary
without any regard to legislative pronouncements whatsoever,
the Washington courts have wavered and abdicated their con-
stitutional duty by, at times, deferring to legislative pronounce-
ments." One year before Healy, the Washington Supreme
Court, though recognizing the potential danger if legislative
declarations of public use were conclusive upon the court,
declined to examine the public character of a highway." The
court found that there was no necessity for a legislative or
judicial determination that a highway is for a public use since
"[f]rom time immemorial, a highway used for the public and
controlled by the public has been considered a public use.""8
Following Healy, the court appeared to contradict itself
and the constitution in Tacoma v. Titlow69 by stating: "[T]he
determination of the questions of public use and public neces-
sity by the proper municipal officers is conclusive upon the
courts in the absence of fraud."70 This early contradiction
appears, however, to be simply an oversight in language or
more a result of the subject matter of the case than a shift in
constitutional interpretation. All of the cases cited in or citing
to Titlow, like Schroeder, involved conceded public uses such as
public roads7 and parks.72
64. Healy, 33 Wash. at 500, 74 P. at 682.
65. Id. at 505, 74 P. at 684.
66. See Cullitan, Inverse Condemnation in Washington State: A Survey of
Judicial History Defining Public Rights in Private Property, 16 GONZ. L. REv. 385,
387-95 (1981). See also infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
67. State ex rel. Schroeder v. Superior Court, 29 Wash. 1, 5-6, 69 P. 366, 368 (1902)
(Dunbar, J. concurring without opinion in unanimous decision).
68. Id. at 4, 69 P. at 367. The court stated that highways were not covered by the
judicial determination provision of the constitution as the issue had been settled by the
framers. Id. at 4, 69 P. at 367-68.
69. 53 Wash. 217, 101 P. 827 (1909) (historical note, counsel for respondents
included T. L. Stiles, former delegate and supreme court judge).
70. Id. at 218, 101 P. at 828. See also Spokane v. Merriam, 80 Wash. 222, 232-33, 141
P. 358, 362 (1914) (citing Tacoma v. Titlow, 53 Wash. 217, 101 P. 827 (1909)).
71. Selde v. Lincoln County, 25 Wash. 198, 65 P. 162 (1901); State ex rel. Schroeder
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Whether an oversight in language or analysis, or merely
the result of conceded public uses, the Titlow language did not
signal an abdication of the court's constitutional duty. Ten
years later in Allen v. Spokane,73 the court seemed to question
its Titlow holding, stating that the constitutional language
"clearly implies that the courts may decide contrary to the dec-
laration of the municipal officers."74  Shortly thereafter, in
State ex rel. Andersen v. Superior Court,75 the court, without
mentioning Titlow, restated its constitutional "duty... to pass
upon the question [of public uses] independently of" any legis-
lative declaration.76  While maintaining its constitutional
authority and duty to disregard any legislative assertions, the
Andersen court rejected an argument that the legislature was
precluded from declaring any public purpose at all.77
In 1941, the court in Carstens v. Public Utility Dist. No. 178
wavered and sub silentio rejected the views in Healy that legis-
lative determinations of public use are not entitled to great
weight, and that other constitutions with different language
are not helpful.79 In Carstens, the court, after mentioning the
constitution's judicial determination clause, cited a New York
case as authority and simply stated "determinations of public
use by the state or its agencies are entitled to great respect by
the courts, since they relate to matters which should, and
must, have been known to the legislature."80 Carstens involved
the generation and distribution of electricity, a long-recognized
public use."'
In 1959, the court seemed to recover and again reassert its
power and duty to declare public uses in Hogue v. Port of Seat-
v. Superior Court, 29 Wash. 1, 69 P. 366 (1902); Adams County v. Schroeder, 30 Wash.
703, 70 P. 1134 (1902); State ex rel. Thomas v. Superior Court, 42 Wash. 521, 85 P. 256
(1906); State ex rel. Pagett v. Superior Court, 47 Wash. 11, 91 P. 241 (1907).
72. Spokane v. Merriam, 80 Wash. 222, 141 P. 358 (1914).
73. 108 Wash. 407, 184 P. 312.
74. Id. at 410, 184 P. at 313.
75. 119 Wash. 406, 205 P. 1051 (1922).
76. Id. at 409-10, 205 P. at 1052. See also State ex rel. Henry v. Superior Court, 155
Wash. 370, 374, 284 P. 788, 789 (1930).
77. 119 Wash. at 410, 205 P. at 1052.
78. 8 Wash. 2d 136, 111 P.2d 583 (1941).
79. 33 Wash. 490, 74 P. 681 (1903).
80. Carstens, 8 Wash. 2d at 142, 111 P.2d at 586 (citing New York City Housing
Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936).
81. Id. at 143, 111 P.2d at 586. See also State ex rel. Wash. Power Co. v. Superior
Ct., 8 Wash. 2d 122, 133, 111 P.2d 577, 582 (1941).
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tle.82 The Hogue court recognized the judicial determination
provision as one of two important limitations placed by the
people of the state on the sovereign's limitless power to take
private property.83 While noting the Carstens decision as a
"potential qualification of the doctrine""4 of judicial determina-
tion, the Hogue court reiterated that the question of public use
was one for the courts,85 and that "the state or its subdivision
[must] prove to the satisfaction of a court that it seeks to
acquire the property for a 'really public' use. '8 6
Since Hogue, however, the Washington courts have repeat-
edly stated that legislative declarations are entitled to great
weight or respect, while asserting that whether the contem-
plated use is really public is solely a judicial question. 7 Given
the clear language of section 16, the limiting purpose behind
the language, and the early cases, it can be argued that the bal-
ance reached by the court skews the views of the framers, and
is inherently contradictory. If the question is solely for the
judiciary and is to be "determined ... without regard to any
legislative assertion,"' it reasonably can be asked how great a
weight can be given to such assertions. While this view does
not preclude legislative public use declarations, 89 it does seem
to require that judicial determinations be made separately and
independently from any such declarations.
The language of section 16 places trust in the judiciary to
make public use determinations independently. This language
82. 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959). This case involved a taxpayer's challenge
to the constitutionality of a 1957 act authorizing the Port of Seattle to issue a tax levy
to support the creation of industrial development districts and to acquire and develop
marginal lands within the district for sale or lease to private parties. The court upheld
the taxpayer's challenge because the proposed condemnation of the lands in question
was not for a public use, and thus the proposed use of the tax levy was not for a public
purpose.
83. Id. at 838, 341 P.2d at 193. The other limitation is that just compensation, as
determined by a jury, must first be paid to the owner, constructively or actually,
before an owner can be deprived of his property. Id.
84. Id. at 832, 341 P.2d at 190.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 838, 341 P.2d at 193.
87. See, e.g., In re Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 624-25, 638 P.2d 549, 555 (1981); Des
Moines v. Hemenway, 73 Wash. 2d 130, 133, 437 P.2d 171, 176 (1968); In re Auburn, 65
Wash. 2d 560, 565, 398 P.2d 723, 726-27 (1965); Miller v. Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 383-
84, 378 P.2d 464, 470 (1963); King County v. Theilman, 59 Wash. 2d 586, 594-95, 369 P.2d
503, 507 (1962); Comment, Abusive Exercises of the Power of Eminent Domain-
Taking a Look at What the Taker Took, 44 WASH. L. REV. 200, 207 n.42 (1968).
88. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (emphasis added).
89. State ex rel. Andersen v. Superior Court, 119 Wash. 406, 205 P. 1051 (1922).
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does not require the court to defer to legislative actions, even if
reasonable, or to give great weight to legislative declarations.
Such a view does not imply any disrespect by the courts for an
equal and coordinate branch of government; it simply executes
the views of the framers who wished to limit legislative power.
The second possible contradiction between case law and
the framers' intentions concerns municipal governments' off-
setting of benefits when calculating and paying just compensa-
tion. The issue of offsetting benefits received by property
owners has generated "great diversity of opinion and more
rules, different from and inconsistent with each other, [than]
have been laid down ... upon any other point in the law of
eminent domain."'  Since 1893, Washington's calculation of
compensation has allowed an offset of benefits in municipal
takings of rights-of-way due to the language "other than
municipal" in section 16.91 Was this the intended effect of the
framers when they included the words in the section?
When originally debated, delegates objecting to the inclu-
sion of the clause exempting municipal corporations feared
that organized towns would take private property without pay-
ing just compensation to the property owners.92 Attempts to
strike the phrase "other than municipal" from the clause in
section 16 failed in the Committee of the Whole and the
convention.93
Years later, in 1897, former delegate and judge of the
Washington Supreme Court, T.L. Stiles, commented on this
clause when using it as an example of how better draftsman-
ship would have made the intended exception more clear.94
Judge Stiles' comments intimated that the exception was
meant to allow municipal corporations "to take possession of
lands condemned for streets as soon as the damages had been
ascertained".95 The clear and uncontradicted opinion of the
90. 3 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 8.62 (3d ed. 1985).
91. See Lewis v. Seattle, 5 Wash. 741, 32 P. 794 (1893); Little v. King County, 159
Wash. 326, 329-32, 293 P. 438, 439-40 (1930); State ex rel. Eastvold v. Yelle, 46 Wash. 2d
166, 168-70, 279 P.2d 645, 647-48 (1955).
92. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 504 (citing the Spokane Falls Review and
Tacoma Daily Ledger of July 30, 1889).
93. See supra notes 83 and 90 and accompanying text.
94. Stiles, supra note 15, at 282-83.
95. Id. Stiles states that cities were "worsted" in a conflict with property owners
when in fact cities have benefitted from the offset of benefits interpretation. Since
Stiles concurred in Lewis v. Seattle, how much weight should his comments receive?
His 1897/1913 article recognizes the mistakes of draftsmanship, however, and perhaps
[Vol. 12:163
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Washington courts on this clause over the years has been to
the contrary. Since 1893, the Washington Supreme Court has
rejected the view that the clause exempts municipal corpora-
tions from paying compensation in advance. 6 Because of the
clear language requiring just compensation to be made initially
in the main clause, the court has consistently construed the
provision to allow municipal corporations to .offset benefits
conferred upon the property owner from the appropriation and
building of a right-of-way.97 However, when private property
is taken by a railroad or private corporation, property owners
are entitled to just compensation for the value of the land
taken and damages to their remaining land without any offset-
ting deductions for any benefits created.98
In terms of actual impact, this apparently different con-
struction has not been too important. The offset provision in
Washington is well-settled in case law and statutes.99 Nor can
it be argued that any real detriment to the governmental
framework created in 1889 has occurred. Perhaps the only real
impact has been to force private corporations that exercise
eminent domain to pay more for rights-of-way to individual
property owners, who arguably receive a windfall. °° The
impact from this windfall is negated somewhat given the abil-
he did not think it necessary to explain in a written concurrence. Cf. SHELDON, SUpra
note 60, at 249-50.
96. Lewis v. Seattle, 5 Wash. 741, 32 P. 794 (1893); Note, The Measure of Damages
in Eminent Domain Proceedings in Washington, 2 WASH. L. REV. 192, 196-97 (1927).
97. See State ex rel. Eastvold v. Yelle, 46 Wash. 2d 166, 279 P.2d 645 (1955); Great
N. Ry. v. State, 102 Wash. 348, 356, 173 P. 40, 43 (1918); Lewis, 5 Wash. 741, 32 P. 794.
98. Seattle & Montana R.R. Co. v. Roeder, 30 Wash. 244, 254-55, 70 P. 498, 502
(1902); Kaufman v. Tacoma, Olympia, & Grays Harbor R.R. Co., 11 Wash. 632, 635, 40
P. 137, 139 (1895); Enoch v. Spokane Falls & No. Ry. Co., 6 Wash. 393, 402, 33 P. 966,
968 (1893) (overruling Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. Coleman, 3 Wash. 228, 234, 28 P. 514,
516 (1891) (allowing offset of benefits)); 3 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 8.6211[48] (3d ed. 1985).
99. See Yelle, 46 Wash. 2d 166, 279 P.2d 645; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 8.04.080,
8.25.210-.260.
100. When property is taken by a private corporation, a property owner is entitled
to the value of the land taken and damages to his remaining land without any
deduction for special benefits. When property is taken by a public corporation or the
state, a property owner is entitled to the value of the land taken and damages to their
remaining land after deducting any special benefits that accrue to the remaining land
because of the public improvement. Thus, public corporations and the state are only
paying for the actual loss to a private property owner. Private corporations pay for the
loss without any deduction; thus private property owners receive a windfall, accruing
special benefits without any offset in the compensation they receive. See Sinnitt,
Offsetting Special Benefits and the Larger Parcel Test in Eminent Domain, 1 GONZ. L.
REv. 77 (1966).
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ity of private corporations to offset benefits when acting under
the authority of municipal corporations and for the benefit of
the municipality.1 1
IV. MUNCIPAL CREDIT CLAUSE
Article VIII, section 7 prohibits municipal corporations
from giving any money or property, or lending any money or
credit, to individuals or associations." 2 The debates surround-
ing this section were some of the most heated in the entire
convention. The issue of municipalities lending their credit
came to be known as the "Walla Walla subsidy" issue or
scheme10 3 because delegates from the Walla Walla area sought
the authority to subsidize a railroad to increase rail competi-
tion in their community. °4
The nine-member Committee on State, County, and
Municipal Indebtedness initially faced the subsidy issue.x 5 In
its report issued July 25,"° the majority, consisting of five
members, 0 7 allowed for municipal loans of credit if two-thirds
of the property taxpayers in the county approved, and limited
such debt to four percent of the assessed value of the property
101. See, e.g., Spokane v. Thompson, 69 Wash. 650, 126 P. 47 (1912); Spokane
Traction Co. v. Granath, 42 Wash. 506, 85 P. 261 (1906); 3 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.6211[48] (3d ed. 1985).
102. See supra note 3. Section 7 also prohibits municipal corporations from
becoming an owner of stock or bonds in any association or company. Article VIII, § 5
prohibits the state from giving or lending its credit to any individual or association. See
intfra notes 126-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differences and
similarities between these two limitations.
103. Airey, supra note 11, at 481; Knapp, supra note 30, at 270; Tacoma Morning
Globe, Aug. 1, 1889, at 1, col. 4; Walla Walla Morning Daily Union, Aug. 6, 1889, at 2,
cols. 1-3.
104. See generally Airey, supra note 11, at 481-87; Fitts, supra note 11, at 64-75;
Knapp, supra note 30, at 270-72. The subsidy issue was apparently so important to
Southeastern Washington that the five counties of Walla Walla, Asotin, Columbia,
Franklin, and Garfield voted against ratification of the constitution. Fitts, supra note
11, at 194.
105. The committee consisted of: J.J. Browne, committee chair, a Democrat from
Spokane Falls, a banker and lawyer; N.G. Blalock, a Democrat from Walla Walla, a
physician and wheat grower; Thomas M. Reed, a Republican from Olympia, a civil
engineer and lawyer; David E. Durie, a Democrat from Seattle, a merchant; Charles
Coey, a Republican from Rockford, a merchant; James A. Hungate, a Democrat from
Pullman, a farmer; Robert F. Sturdevant, a Republican from Dayton, a lawyer; H.W.
Fairweather, a Republican from Sprague, a banker; and Charles T. Fay, a Republican
from Steilacoom, a farmer. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 19, 466-86; C.M.
BARTON, LEGISLATIVE HANDBOOK AND MANUAL 167 (1889-90).
106. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 152.
107. The majority were committee secretary Blalock, Sturdevandt, Reed, Fay, and
Durie. Id. at 152-53.
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in the county.'0 8 The minority report, signed by four members
of the Committee, 10 9 flatly prohibited any municipal aid or sub-
sidy of private corporations, associations, or individuals." 0
The Committee of the Whole faced the subsidy issue on
July 31 and August 1."' Heated debate occurred in the con-
vention, and throughout the territory, on the proposed major-
ity and minority reports."
2
Proponents of the majority report vigorously argued that
subsidies were the only means to increase railroad competition
and protect citizens from the extortionate prices charged by
railroads in the transportation of goods."l3 They asserted that
the people could be trusted and that enough safeguards existed
in the proposed section to protect the people from ill-advised
subsidies." 4
Opponents argued that the use of subsidies, as shown in
other states, was "vicious," was open to abuse, and would allow
the majority in a county to oppress and burden the minority.
Opponents maintained that neither public money nor the
power of taxation should be used for the benefit of private
interests.11
5
The Committee of the Whole discussed several amend-
108. The text of the majority report read as follows:
No county shall hereafter give or loan its money, property or credit to or in
aid of any individual, company, corporation or association unless two-thirds of
the property taxpayers thereof being legal electors therein and voting thereon
vote therefor at an election to be held for such purpose, and in no case shall
the sum so voted exceed in the aggregate four per centum of its assessed
valuation for county and state purposes as shown by its assessment next
preceding such election.
The Legislature shall enact the necessary laws to carry out the provisions
of this Article.
Id. at 152, 680.
109. The minority members were committee chairman Browne, Hungate, Coey,
and Fairweather. Id. at 153.
110. The minority report text was the same as finally adopted, except it did not
contain the clause "except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm." Id. at
153, 690. The minority report paralleled a similar provision in the proposed
Washington Constitution of 1878. See Knapp, supra note 30, at 272; Washington's First
Constitution, 1878, 10 WASH. HIST. Q. 110, 124 (1919) (art. XII, § 9).
111. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 202.
112. See Fitts, supra note 11, at 64 (citing Airey, supra note 11, at 481). See
generally Seattle Times, July 23, 1889, at 4, col. 1; Id., July 24, 1889, at 4, cols. 1-2; Id.,
Aug. 1, 1889, at 4, cols. 1-2; ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 667-68.
113. Airey, supra note 11, at 484; ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 680-81.
114. ROSENOW JouRNAL, supra note 13, at 681-82; Fitts, supra note 11, at 69;
Seattle Times, July 24, 1889, at 4, col. 1
115. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 681-82; Fitts, supra note 11, at 70; Airey,
supra note 11, at 485-86.
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ments to both reports. Proposed amendments to the majority
report seeking to ensure continued competition among rail-
roads and to require that subsidies be for a public use failed.
116
Despite these attempts to save the majority report, the motion
to accept it was defeated." 7 Several attempts to amend the
minority report followed, with only the exception for the nec-
essary support of the poor and infirm succeeding."' On
August 1, the Committee of the Whole approved the original
minority report" 9 and the convention adopted the final text
later that day.
20
Washington's constitutional prohibition against the lending
of municipal credit is not unique. Using similar language, all
of the 1889 conventions prohibited their states and their
municipalities from aiding any corporation or individual.' 2 '
Commentators 22 and many Washington court decisions 2  have
116. Delegate Powers' August 1 motion to add to the majority the following,
"provided that any railroad company shall not combine with or sell out to any
competing railroad company, but the railroad so aided shall be maintained and
operated as an independent public line," was either withdrawn or defeated. The
Spokane Falls Review reported it as being withdrawn, while the Seattle Times and
Tacoma Daily Ledger reported it as being defeated. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13,
at 682-83. Delegate Stiles' August 1 motion to amend the majority to require subsidies
be for public uses was defeated 34 to 27. Id. at 683.
117. Id.
118. The first motion to allow money to be given or loaned for the necessary
support of the poor was defeated. A motion to allow cities to grant terminal and
shipping facilities and rights-of-way was defeated 43 to 31. A motion to except the
building and operation of irrigation canals from the prohibition was defeated 30 to 27.
Id. at 207-209, 683-84.
119. Id. at 207-08, 683 (approved by a vote of 49 to 25).
120. Id. at 210, 684 (approved by a vote of 48 to 24).
121. HICKS, supra note 17, at 123; Comment, State Constitutional Provisions
Prohibiting the Loaning of Credit to Private Enterprise-A Suggested Analysis, 41 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 135, 136-37 (1969).
122. Reich, Lending of Credit Reinterpreted New Opportunities for Public and
Private Sector Cooperation, 19 GONZ. L. REV. 639, 639-43 (1984) [hereinafter Reich];
Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An
Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 265, 277-81 (1963); Note, State
Constitution-Debt Limitations-Municipality's Issuance of Revenue Bonds to
Finance Private Pollution Control Facilities Violates State Constitution, 50 WASH. L.
REV. 440, 446 (1975) [hereinafter Washington Note]; Comment, State Constitutional
Provisions Prohibiting the Loaning of Credit to Private Enterprise-A Suggested
Analysis, 41 U. CoLO. L. REV. 135, 136 (1969); Comment, State Constitutional
Limitations on a Municipality's Power to Appropriate Funds or Extend Credit to
Individuals and Associations, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 97-98 (1959); HICKS, supra note 17,
at 123.
123. Marysville v. State, 101 Wash. 2d 50, 54-55, 676 P.2d 989, 991-92 (1984);
Housing Finance Comm'n v. O'Brien, 100 Wash. 2d 491, 494, 671 P.2d 247, 249 (1983)
(construing similar art. VIII, § 5); State ex rel. Graham v. Olympia, 80 Wash. 2d 672,
675, 497 P.2d 924, 926 (1972); Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Taxpayers of Snohomish
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recognized the framers' clear premise of attempting to protect
counties and other municipalities from bankruptcy and corrup-
tion by the railroads.'24
As the Washington Supreme Court has noted, many Wash-
ington case decisions involving section 7 have been "erratic"'25
as the court has struggled to apply the constitutional language
to the realities of contemporary financial situations con-
fronting municipalities.
Washington cases involving the municipal lending of credit
clause have attracted the attention of many commentators. 126
Article VIII, section 7 cases are intertwined with cases involv-
ing section 5 of the same article.127  The history of these two
sections has been confusing, as they have been construed to
contain similar prohibitions and exceptions. 128
Despite the plain language used in both credit clauses, it is
unclear from the court's interpretation and analysis whether
the framers' views have been followed. This is not a criticism
of the court; rather it illustrates the common problem of rec-
County, 78 Wash. 2d 724, 726-27, 479 P.2d 61, 62-63 (1971); Rausch v. Chapman, 16
Wash. 568, 573-74, 48 P. 253, 254-55 (1897).
124. For broader views of the framers' purposes and policies, cf. C. KIPPEN,
ARTICLE VIII, SECTIONS 5 & 7: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROVISIONS, THEIR IMPACT
AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE at 1-6 through 1-11 (1979) [hereinafter Kippen]
(Kippen describes the two underlying policies behind § 7 as a fear of a risk of loss and
a fear of public and private entanglement). See also State ex rel. Potter v. King
County, 45 Wash. 519, 528, 88 P. 935, 938 (1907) (constitutional restraints on municipal
corporations are "intended for the protection of minorities, for the protection of
posterity, and to protect majorities against their own improvidence, and it is the duty
of the courts to enforce them."); Japan Line, Ltd. v. McCaffree, 88 Wash. 2d 93, 98, 558
P.2d 211, 214 (1977) ("manifest purpose of [art. 8, §§ 5 & 7] in the constitution is to
prevent state funds from being used to benefit private interests where the public
interest is not primarily served.").
125. Marysville v. State, 101 Wash. 2d at 52, 676 P.2d at 990. Similarly, § 5's case
history has been "checkered," In re Marriage of Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d 255, 264, 634
P.2d 877, 882 (1981), and "has not been smooth." Housing Finance Comm'n v. O'Brien,
100 Wash. 2d at 494, 671 P.2d at 249.
126. Kippen, supra note 124; Reich, supra note 122; Washington Note, supra note
122; Spitzer, An Analytical View of Recent "Lending of Credit" Decisions in
Washington State, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 195 (1985) [hereinafter Spitzer]. Cf.
Note, State Lending of Credit-New Analysis of State Constitutional Prohibitions, 61
WASH. L. REV. 263 (1986) (discussing art. VIII, § 5) [hereinafter State Lending].
127. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5. "Credit not to be loaned. The credit of the state
shall not, in any manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association,
company, or corporation." Id.
128. The Washington courts have construed and interpreted article VIII, § 7 and
article VIII, § 5 as containing similar prohibitions and- exceptions in implementing
nearly identical policies with different political entities. See, e.g., Health Care Fac. v.
Ray, 93 Wash. 2d 108, 115, 605 P.2d 1260, 1264 (1980). See also Kippen, supra note 124,
at 1-11 through 1-18.
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onciling the apparent intent of the framers with seemingly
contrary common sense applications to modern develop-
ments.'" The court's struggle with this basic problem has
made it unclear whether the focus has been, and continues to
be, on a literal application of the language of the credit
clauses,130 on the policies and purposes underlying the two sec-
tions,131 on a combination of the two approaches, 132 or on
exceptions for "recognized governmental functions.'
113 3
One of the first contributions to the uncertainty in the
analysis of the credit clauses arose in Morgan v. Department of
129. A classic example of the court's struggle faithfully to apply the framers'
premises is Morgan v. Department of Social Security, 14 Wash. 2d 156, 127 P. 686
(1942), infra note 134-36 and accompanying text, which upheld state welfare aid to
private individuals although no similar "necessary support of the poor and infirm"
exception exists for the state in article VIII, § 5. A literal reading of the constitution
would seem to prohibit state aid to private individuals. See also Public Util. Dist. No. 1
v. Taxpayers of Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 724, 729, 479 P.2d 61, 64 (recognizing
municipal corporations' need for new means of financing public works in order to
fulfill their responsibilities); State ex rel. Graham v. Olympia, 80 Wash. 2d 672, 685-86,
497 P.2d 924, 931 (1972) (Finley, J., concurring specially); State ex rel. O'Connell v.
Port of Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 801, 804-06, 399 P.2d 623, 626-27 (1965).
130. Spitzer, supra note 126 (advocating a literal application of the terms of §§ 5, 7
along with a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative or municipal
enactment); Ferndale v. Friberg, 107 Wash. 2d 602, 608-09, 732 P.2d 143, 147 (1987)
(citing Higher Educ. Fac. Auth. v. Gardner, 103 Wash. 2d 838, 699 P.2d 1240 (1985) and
finding no actual loan of public credit in a § 7 case). Cf Gardner, 103 Wash. 2d at 846-
47, 699 P.2d at 1245 (adopting Spitzer's analysis by breaking article VIII, § 5 into four
discrete components); Department of Labor and Indus. v. Wendt, 47 Wash. App. 427,
434, 735 P.2d 1334, 1338 (1987) (citing and applying Spitzer's analysis adopted in
Gardner in a § 5 case).
131. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 122, at 662 (proposing new rules of analysis
suggested by the credit clauses' historical roots, the trend of recent cases, and public
policy considerations); Marysville v. State, 101 Wash. 2d 50, 676 P.2d 989 (1984);
Washington State Hous. Fin. Comm'n v. O'Brien, 100 Wash. 2d 491, 671 P.2d 247 (1983).
132. See Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 108 Wash. 2d 679, 701-03, 743 P.2d 793, 804-05 (1987).
Cf. State Lending, supra note 126, at 271-73 (proposing, when analyzing § 5 cases, two
additional factors to add to four discrete components analyzed in Gardner-the
importance of public purpose and the extent of public control to minimize the risk of
loss).
133. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d 255, 261-62, 634 P.2d 877, 881
(1981) (opinion in a § 5 case signed by only three judges, with three others concurring
in result only, one judge dissenting, and two dissenting in part and concurring in' part
by separate opinion); Public Employment Relations Comm'n v. Kennewick, 99 Wash.
2d 832, 838, 664 P.2d 1240, 1243 (1983) (a § 5 case); Department of Labor and Indus. v.
Wendt, 47 Wash. App. 427, 435, 735 P.2d 1334, 1339 (1987) (a § 5 case). Cf. Washington
State Housing Fin. Comm'n v. O'Brien, 100 Wash. 2d 491, 505-06, 671 P.2d 247, 255-56
(1983) (Rosellini, J. dissenting) (objecting to majority's characterization of Marriage of
Johnson and arguing Johnson stood for the "well-established principle that the
constitution permits the expenditure of state funds for the performance of recognized
governmental services as law enforcement, fire protection or consumer protection"
(original emphasis, citation omitted)).
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Social Security."s Morgan involved a challenge to the Wash-
ington Senior Citizens Grants Act made shortly after the state
legislature had shifted responsibility for welfare relief to the
state from local governments. In granting state aid to private
individuals, Morgan quietly began the similar interpretation of
the two credit clauses 35 without rigorously examining the con-
stitutional challenge to state, as opposed to municipal, aid to
the poor and infirm.
3 6
Since Morgan, the court has consistently construed the
two sections to contain similar prohibitions and exceptions.3 7
While the similar interpretation of both clauses appears to be
contrary to some of the principles of constitutional interpreta-
tion existing at the time of the 1889 convention and recognized
by the court, 38 it does reflect the difficulty of strictly applying
the framers' language to changed circumstances.
Three bank deposit cases, Bardsley v. Sternberg,'3 9 Aber-
deen v. National Surety Co.,' 4° and State ex rel. Graham v.
134. 14 Wash. 2d 156, 127 P.2d 686 (1942).
135. "The support of the poor and needy is a recognized governmental function. If
the act by its terms purports to relieve persons not in actual need, it might well be
challenged upon constitutional grounds." Id. at 169, 127 P.2d at 69.
136. Kippen, supra note 124, at 1-14 through 1-18. See also State v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 20 Wash. 2d 588, 591-92, 148 P.2d 323, 324-25 (1944) (citing Morgan to uphold state
welfare relief); Morgan, 14 Wash. 2d at 194, 127 P.2d at 702 (Simpson, J., dissenting)
(seemingly unknowingly, recognizing clear language of constitution that providing for
the poor is a local, not a state concern).
137. See supra note 128. Although one commentator identified the possibility of
the court recognizing and attributing significance to the differences in the wording of
the two credit clauses due to the language in Marysville and Gardner (though Gardner
stated that the two sections are generally interpreted in like manner), State Lending,
supra note 126, the court continues to interpret the two sections similarly. See Tacoma
v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wash. 2d 679, 701 n.13, 743 P.2d 793, 804 (1987) (construing
§ 7). See also Department of Labor & Indus. v. Wendt, 47 Wash. App. 427, 433, 735 P.2d
1334, 1338 (1987) (construing § 5).
138. If a constitutional provision is clear, plain, and unambiguous on its face, then
no construction or interpretation is permissible. Anderson v. Chapman, 86 Wash. 2d
189, 191-92, 543 P.2d 229, 230 (1975); State ex rel. O'Connell v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1,
79 Wash. 2d 237, 240-41, 484 P.2d 393, 395 (1971). Cf. State Capitol Comm'n v. Lister, 91
Wash. 9, 14, 156 P. 858, 859-69 (1916) (citing COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 92;
BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 79) (words in a constitution are to be understood in the
ordinary and popular sense). The different language used in §§ 5 and 7 is clear, plain,
and unambiguous on its face. Courts may also not create exceptions to provisions
where none have been expressed in the constitution. Anderson, 86 Wash. 2d at 196, 543
P.2d at 223; State ex rel. O'Connell v. Port of Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 801, 806, 399 P.2d
623, 626-27 (1965). Section 5 contains no express exceptions, and § 7 only contains an
exception for the necessary support of the poor and infirm.
139. 18 Wash. 612, 52 P. 251 (1898).
140. 151 Wash. 55, 275 P. 62 (1929).
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Olympia,'4' present good examples of the struggle by the court
since 1889, in the face of changing circumstances and different
financial instruments, to maintain a consistent, coherent, and
principled interpretation of section 7. Less than ten years after
the constitutional convention, the court upheld the deposit of
Tacoma's funds into a bank "simply for safekeeping, [and] sub-
ject to re-payment on demand."'" The court noted that depos-
its are "neither a loan nor an investment of funds, in the
ordinary meaning of these words .... ,,'4 In 1929, the Aber-
deen court declared that the City of Aberdeen's purchases of
interest-bearing time certificates of deposit were illegal under
section 7 and a bonding statute. The court found the deposit,
in effect, to be a loan or investment because Aberdeen's money
was left in the bank for a fixed time while earning interest.'"
The court distinguished Bardsley because Aberdeen's funds
were not subject to check or to withdrawal. 4 5
In 1972, the court again faced the issue of municipal depos-
its of funds in a declaratory action brought against the City of
Olympia challenging the constitutionality of statutes authoriz-
ing the deposit of municipal funds in interest-bearing time
deposits. 4 ' The Graham court illustrates well the problem, in
contemporary times, of trying to give effect to the clear lan-
guage of the constitution and the framers' intent.
Three justices concurred in Justice Hunter's opinion
upholding the statutes, which relied both upon a literal appli-
cation of the language of section 7 and an attempt to follow the
intent of the framers of the constitution. Justice Hunter first
found, without citing Bardsley, that bank deposits were not
loans in the ordinary and popular sense of the word.147 He
then examined the framers' purposes and objectives, conclud-
ing that the framers' intentions were to protect and secure
141. 80 Wash. 2d 672, 497 P.2d 924 (1972).
142. Bardsley, 18 Wash. at 624-25, 52 P. at 255.
143. Id. at 625, 52 P. at 255.
144. Aberdeen, 151 Wash. at 59-61, 275 P. at 63-64.
145. Id. at 58, 275 P. at 63.
146. Graham, 80 Wash. 2d at 673, 497 P.2d at 925.
147. Id. at 676, 497 P.2d at 926. This is clearly consistent with a rule of
interpretation that language in the constitution is to be taken and understood in its
natural, ordinary, general, and popular sense. State ex rel. O'Connell v. Public Util.
Dist. No. 1, 79 Wash. 2d 237, 240-41, 484 P.2d 393, 395 (1971); State ex rel. State Capitol
Comm'n v. Lister, 91 Wash. 9, 14, 156 P. 858, 859-60 (1916). This examination of
whether the challenged action is literally prohibited by the constitution follows
Spitzer's proposed analysis. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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public funds from a risk of loss.' Given the extensive protec-
tion of funds from federal deposit insurance, Justice Hunter
concluded that a prohibition of statutorily authorized deposits
would be inconsistent with the framers' purposes and objec-
tives.149 The Graham plurality distinguished Aberdeen, stating
that the holding of Aberdeen was based upon a statutory viola-
tion, and rejected as dictum the characterization of time depos-
its as constitutionally prohibited loans." °
Tested against the framers' purposes, the Graham plural-
ity arguably went too far. Regardless of the safeguards, if the
deposits were loans, and the rest of section 7 applied, they
were prohibited. The framers decided that any municipal
loans posed unacceptable risks, and it is questionable whether
the legislature or the courts can say whether certain safe-
guards are sufficient to protect against the risks. Indeed, in
referring to a municipal loan one year previously, the court in
State ex rel. O'Connell v. Public Utility Dist. No. 1. of Klickitat
County'' stated, "[t]he constitution, however, makes no dis-
tinction; it prohibits all such transactions, good or bad, large or
small."' 52
In his concurring opinion in Graham, Justice Finley
explicitly recognized the difficulty in applying the exact words
of the constitution and implementing the framers' intent to
accommodate contemporary needs. Although he admitted
Olympia's time deposits were loans in the strict sense of the
word, he concurred in upholding them because the framers
would not have prohibited them if faced with the problem, and
because sufficient safeguards existed to serve the purpose of
section 7 of protecting the integrity of public funds.'53
148. Graham, 80 Wash. 2d at 682, 497 P.2d at 930.
149. Id. at 681-82, 497 P.2d at 929.
150. Id. at 682-83, 497 P.2d at 930.
151. 79 Wash. 2d 237, 484 P.2d 393 (1971).
152. Id. at 241, 484 P.2d at 396. See also Port of Longview v. Taxpayers of Port of
Longview, 85 Wash. 2d 216, 231, 527 P.2d 263, 271, reh'g denied, 533 P.2d 128 (1974)
(municipal loans are violative of the constitution "regardless of whether or not [they
serve] a laudable public purpose") (citing Johns v. Wadsworth, 80 Wash. 352, 354, 141
P. 892, 893 (1914)); Lassila v. Wenatchee, 89 Wash. 2d 804, 811-12, 576 P.2d 54, 58-59
(1978); State ex rel. O'Connell v. Port of Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 801, 805-06, 399 P.2d 623,
625-27 (1965).
153. Graham, 80 Wash. 2d at 685-86, 497 P.2d at 931-32 (Finley, J., concurring
specially). "However, I believe that the exact words of the constitution should not be
strictly and restrictively construed inconsistently with the probably underlying or
basic intent of the drafters and contrary to a common sense accommodation to the
needs of the times." Id.
1989]
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Justice Hale, joined by Justice Rosellini, concurred in the
Graham result, but would have affirmed on a narrower
ground." 4 Justice Hale reasoned that the time deposits in ques-
tion would not be a prohibited loan because they were subject
to withdrawal at will without any substantial penalty.1 5 5 Jus-
tice Hale also commented that section 7 must be applied to
prohibit all municipal loans or investments even when "well-
secured and exceptionally safe," save for the sole and explicit
exception for the necessary support of the poor and infirm.'56
He further disagreed with the majority's characterization of
the purposes of section 7, finding a broader prohibition
"expressly aimed at the use of public money by any private
entity for private purposes.
' '1 5 7
Justice Wright in dissent, joined by Justice Stafford, would
have applied the clear language of section 7 and followed Aber-
deen to reverse and hold Olympia's investments violative of
section 7.158
These cases illustrate the various methods of analysis used
by the court in its attempt faithfully to apply the provisions of
article VIII, section 7, to municipal credit cases. While the
court may shift from a literal analysis to a policy analysis, or
from a liberal view to conservative view of allowing municipal
credit to be provided, the court's decisions are rationally
grounded. These differences of perspective and mixtures of
analysis simply reflect the problem of reconciling the changed
circumstances of contemporary society with a broad constitu-
tional prohibition specifically intended in 1889 to control the
problem of railroad subsidization. While such a specific intent
does not imply that the prohibition is not applicable today, it
does require the court at times to focus on the underlying
premises of the framers, rather than the literal text in apply-
ing section 7 to contemporary financing schemes.
V. CORPORATIONS ARTICLE
The proper limits to place on corporations, trusts, and rail-
154. 80 Wash. 2d at 687, 497 P.2d at 932 (Hale, J., concurring in result).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 686-87, 497 P.2d at 932.
157. Id. at 687, 497 P.2d at 932.
158. Id at 687-89, 497 P.2d at 933 (Wright, J., dissenting). Justice Wright also
found Olympia's investment in a savings and loan association under the authorizing
statutes violative of a later clause in § 7, which prohibited the ownership, directly or
indirectly, of any stock or bonds of any association. Id.
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roads were a central issue in the convention. An attitude of
ambivalence toward powerful business organizations existed
throughout the five July 4 constitutional conventions, their
territories, and the nation. 15 9 In Washington, tension between
the desire to protect individuals and the state from overpower-
ing financial forces was set against the recognized need for
investment to help develop the vast natural resources and eco-
nomic potential of the state.16
0
The debates concerning the corporations article, and the
text eventually adopted, clearly portray the mood and tensions
of the intellectual environment of the day. Reformist attitudes
to limit corporations contrasted with views seeking to
encourage financial investment in the state and to not overly
restrict corporations.
The Committee on Corporations Other Than Municipal,
chaired by John Kinnear of Seattle, consisted of nine mem-
bers.161 This committee reported and recommended twenty-
four sections to the convention on July 26.162 The Committee
of the Whole considered the proposed Corporations Article at
various times from August 1 to 5.1' On August 6, the conven-
tion considered the numerous amendments made by the Com-
mittee of the Whole to the original committee report.16 Final
changes were made before approval of the twenty-two section
159. See S. CASHMAN, supra note 29, at 283; J. GARRATY, supra note 29, at 311-12;
THE GILDED AGE: AMERICA, 1865-1900, at 111-12 (R. Bartlett ed. 1969); HICKS, supra
note 17, at 43-52; W. HILL, WAS1INGTON-A CONSTITUTION ADAPTED To THE COMING
STATE 45 (reprinted from The Morning Oregonian, July 4, 1889, at 9); Crawford, supra
note 12, at 249; Fitts, supra note 11, at 95; Knapp, supra note 30, at 239-40; Walker,
What Shall Be Done About The Trusts?, PROC. WA. ST. B. ASS'N 92, 92-100 (1899);
Donworth, Corporations, PROC. WA. ST. B. ASS'N 94, 96-107 (1896).
160. See Fitts, supra note 11, at 98; ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 733;
Tacoma Daily Ledger, July 27, 1889, at 2, col. 3; Tacoma Daily News, July 13, 1889, at 2,
col. 1; Id., July 29, 1889, at 2, col. 2; Washington Standard, Aug. 2, 1889, at 4, cols, 1-2;
Yakima Herald, Aug. 1, 1889, at 2 cols. 2-3.
161. The committee consisted of the following members: Chairman Kinnear, a
Republican and a lawyer from Seattle; J.J. Weisenburger, an Independent and a
Whatcom lawyer; J.P.T. McCroskey, a Democrat and a Colfax farmer; P.C. Sullivan, a
Republican and a lawyer from Tacoma; Lewis Neace, a Democrat and a farmer from
Waitsburg; B.L. Sharpstein, a Democrat and a lawyer from Walla Walla; John A.
Shoudy, a Republican and a merchant from Ellensburg; Francis Henry, a Democrat
and a lawyer from Olympia; and Charles Coey, a Republican and a merchant from
Rockford. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 20-21, 468-89; LEGISLATIVE HAND-
BOOK AND MANUAL, supra note 105, at 167-68.
162. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 166-71.
163. Id. at 212, 215, 219, 247.
164. Id. at 252-63.
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Corporations Article on August 10.161
Debate regarding article XII reflected the ambivalence
toward corporations. This debate also revealed the legislative
character of the constitution that was criticized during and
after the convention." Most notable are those parts of the
article that were changed or deleted in the final form of the
constitution.
The Corporations Committee's proposed article attempted
to place much stronger limits on corporations and railroads
than those that were finally adopted. Opponents of these por-
tions of the proposed article claimed that they were too legisla-
tive and merely restated settled law,16 7 or that they would
hamper investment in the state.16 The proposed sections
rejected by the Committee of the Whole and the convention
included those that would have: Limited corporations to those
activities authorized by their charters or by law; required cor-
porations to maintain offices in Washington and keep corpo-
rate books open for inspection; defined where corporations
could be sued; and constitutionally established a railroad com-
mission to control and regulate common carriers. 69
Of all the sections in the Corporations Article, the one
that caused the most controversy was an attempt to establish a
railroad commission."' ° Although many states had railroad
165. Id. at 318-25, 770.
166. Many critics of the constitution claimed that too many provisions that more
closely resembled legislation than organic principles were included in the constitution.
They objected to attempts to use the constitution to provide for and against everything
as with a code of laws. See generally HIcKS, supra note 17, at 24-26; Airey, supra note
11, at 489; Deutsch, supra note 29, at 283-84; Fitts, supra note 11, at 188; Thorpe, supra
note 30, at 507-08; Blaine, Decennial of our State Constitution, PROC. WA. ST. B. ASs'N
101, 102-03 (1899); Yakima Herald, Aug. 1, 1889, at 2, col. 2.
A quote from the Seattle Post-Intelligencer from August 12, 1889, sums up the
dispute over legislative provisions in the constitution: "The principal source of
objection is that there is so much attempt at legislation. Of course, nothing is supposed
to be placed in the Constitution that is not fundamental, and there is a wonderful
diversity of opinion as to what is fundamental." See Airey, supra note 11, at 493.
167. See Fitts, supra note 11, at 95-96, 99-101; ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at
739-48.
168. See Fitts, supra note 11, at 98-105; ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 747-
48.
169. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 741-65.
170. Id. at 733; Airey, supra note 11, at 493 (citing the August 12, 1889, Seattle
Post-Intelligencer for the view that the fight over the Railroad Commission was the
hardest so far in the convention).
The Railroad Commission proposed in the July 26 report of the Committee on
Corporations Other Than Municipal to provide for three elected members empowered
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commissions, only California's was constitutionally rooted.'7 1
Intensive lobbying surrounded the debate over the commission
in the Committee of the Whole and in the convention from
August 2 to 10.172 Proponents of the commission advocated it
as a means to establish a commission that might never come
about legislatively because of the powerful railroad lobby, a
way to settle disputes between consumers and the railroads,
and a way to regulate reasonably and fairly the rates and struc-
ture of transportation in the state.1 73 Various opponents feared
that the commission itself might be controlled by the railroad
lobby, trusted the legislature to be able effectively to regulate
the railroads, or felt any railroad commission would threaten
investment and future rail building in the state.
17 4
The provisions written and the progressive mood of the
period indicate the framers' attempts to control and limit cor-
porations and railroads without driving away crucial invest-
ment and rail lines. Although it seems as if the hopes of the
framers have been met, it does not appear that the methods by
which their hopes were realized were what they had planned.
First, the state legislature proved to be very slow initially in
enacting provisions to regulate corporations and railroads, a
prediction of many of the delegates and citizens that unfortu-
nately came true. 7 5 Second, of the restrictions that eventually
did affect most corporations and railroads, statutory, rather
than constitutional limitations, were more effective. 7 6 Finally,
the amount and effectiveness of federal regulations were
unlikely to have been foreseen by the framers.177
Washington's article on corporations is similar to many of
the corporations articles in the constitutions of states admitted
to supervise and regulate the railroads and all other common carriers. See ROSENOW
JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 758-59 for complete text.
The "Railroad and Transportation Commission" discussed in article XII, § 18, has
had several names, from a Railroad Commission, State ex rel. Great N. Ry. Co. v.
Railroad Comm'n of Wash., 52 Wash. 33, 100 P. 184 (1909), to a Public Service
Commission, to the current Utilities and Transportation Commission provided in
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.01.010-.300.
171. See generally Airey, supra note 11, at 491 (of 21 states with commissions, only
California's was consitutionally incorporated).
172. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 760-65; Airey, supra note 11, at 490.
173. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 760-62; Airey, supra note 11, at 491.
174. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 13, at 759-63; Airey, supra note 11, at 490-91.
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in the late nineteenth century. 78 When drafted and ratified, it
was the origin of much of the controversy and discussion over
the proposed constitution and reflected the ambivalence of the
time by constitutionally attempting to limit corporate powers
and abuses. However, like the "curious incident of the dog in
the night-time" that did nothing,179 the actual influence of the
article in limiting the powers and abuses of corporations and
railroads in Washington has been relatively modest.8 0
Most of the impact upon corporations has been through
national and state legislative measures.'18  With the develop-
ment and growth of Washington, the national government, and
legislative restrictions, the power and resultant fear among cit-
izens of corporate monopolies, banks, insurance companies,
and railroads has diminished. However, an attitude of ambiva-
lence continues to this day.
Despite the reform attempts constitutionally to restrict
corporations, article XII itself has not had much impact upon
the corporate abuse of power feared by the framers. In the
early years after the convention, many recognized the failure
of the constitution adequately to control railroads, monopolies,
and trusts.8 2 Having left to the legislature many corporate
provisions that were not self-executing, 8 1 it was several years
178. See generally HICKS, supra note 17, at 43-52; Airey, supra note 11, at 487;
Beardsley, supra note 26, at 393-97.
179. A.C. DOYLE, THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES: THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK
HOLMES-SILVER BLAZE 347 (1930).
180. See, e.g., Dewell & Gittinger, Antitrust-The Washington Antitrust Laws, 36
WASH. L. REV. 239, 241 (1961) [hereinafter Dewell]; Dwyer, Antitrust Development in
the United States, outline of remarks printed in PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS
(Washington Continuing Legal Education ed. 1968) [hereinafter Dwyer].
A computerized search revealed that article XII has been considered in slightly
more than 90 cases by the Washington appellate courts, and most of these cases have
been resolved by relying on statutory provisions. In contrast, article VIII, § 7 cases
alone number over 70, and almost 300 cases involve or discuss article I, § 16.
181. See generally Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27; Consumer Protection
Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.86.010-86.920; Federal Trade Commission Act of
1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58; Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and Transportation Acts of
1920, 1940, and 1958, Title 49 U.S.C.; Robinson-Patman Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15-21a;
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7; Dewell, supra note 180, at 242-43;
Dwyer, supra note 180, at 39; Forkosch, Antitrust in the United States: Some Thoughts
on Historical and Recent Developments, 11 GONZ. L. REV. 892, 897-900; WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. tit. 81 (1988).
182. See Knapp, supra note 30, at 273; Stiles, supra note 15, at 286; Fitts, supra
note 11, at 189; Message of Governor J. H. McGraw to the Legislature of 1895, at 30
(Olympia, 1895) ("Our railroad legislation has been tentative and trifling"), cited in
Crawford, supra note 12, at 250 n.18.
183. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 19 in relevant part: "The legislature shall,
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until much of the framers' goals were effectuated.'84
Although article XII itself has not proved to be the hoped-
for dominant restraint on corporations, its inclusion in the con-
stitution was not all for naught. The component sections of
article XII "[stand] as the complete and wholly unobscured
guide pointing out the plain pathway of public policy in this
state.' 1 85 Though slow to act initially, the legislature followed
the direction of the constitution and the growing progressive
mood of the nation, and did establish state restrictions and reg-
ulations of corporations and railroads.
VI. CONCLUSION
The review of these provisions of the Washington Consti-
tution and the cases interpreting them is meant to be an illus-
tration of the struggle by the supreme court to be faithful to
the underlying premises of the framers and to the constitution
itself; a struggle made more difficult by ever-changing facts
and conditions, some of which would be unrecognizable and
by general law of uniform operation, provide reasonable regulations to give effect to
this section." (regulating telegraph and telephone companies); State ex rel. Spokane &
British Columbia Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Spokane, 24 Wash. 53, 60, 63 P. 1116, 1118-19 (not a
self-operative provision); WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 22 in relevant part: "The legislature
shall pass laws for the enforcement of this section by adequate penalties" (prohibiting
monopolies and trusts in the state) (Northwestern Warehouse Co. v. Oregon Ry. &
Navig. Co., 32 Wash. 218, 227, 73 P. 388, 391-92, (1903), (not a self-operative provision));
WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (prohibiting discrimination in railroad transportation
charges) (Northwestern Warehouse). Cf. id. art. XII, § 20.
Prohibition against free transportation for public officers. No railroad or
other transportation company shall grant free passes, or sell tickets or passes
at a discount, other than as sold to the public generally, to any member of the
legislature, or to any person holding any public office within this state. The
legislature shall pass laws to carry this provision into effect.
IdL
See also Muldoon v. Seattle City Ry. Co., 10 Wash. 311, 313, 38 P. 995, 995 (1894)
(deemed self-operative).
184. The railroad commission authorized in WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 18, was not
created until 1907. See Crawford, supra note 12, at 252 (citing First Annual Report of
the Railroad Commission of Washington (Olympia, 1907)). This railroad commission
currently exists as the Utilities and Transportation Commission. See supra note 169.
T.L. Stiles' comments of 1897, reprinted in 1913, indicate no legislation was introduced
to carry out the prohibitions against monopolies and trusts in art. XII, § 22. Stiles,
supra note 15, at 286. Statutes making it a misdemeanor to violate art. XII, § 22 and
authorizing the forfeiture of corporate franchises as a penalty were not enacted until
1909. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9.22.010, .030 (repealed by 1975 Wash. Laws, 1st
Ex. Sess., ch. 260, § 9A.92.010); Dewell, supra note 180, at 240.
185. American Export Door Corp. v. John A. Gauger Co., 154 Wash. 514, 519, 283
P. 462, 463 (1929) (referring to article XII, § 22).
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even unknown to the framers."' The court has generally
avoided the rigidities of a textual determination of constitu-
tional principles, while at the same time it has attempted to
honor what it has perceived to be the real meaning underlying
the text. As the cases cited in this Article illustrate, this
meaning will be affected by the composition of the court, the
time of the decision, and the factual pattern before the court to
which the constitution must be applied. In the final analysis,
this review demonstrates the humanness of judges in grappling
with real cases, not just abstract formulations, and the benefits
of the appellate system with a multi-judge court. Thus do
judges play their part in that glorious adventure of self-govern-
ment. May it always be so.
186. See, e.g., Higher Educ. Auth. v. Gardner, 103 Wash. 2d 838, 699 P.2d 1240
(1985); State Health Care Facil. Auth. v. Spellman, 96 Wash. 2d 68, 633 P.2d 866 (1981).
Sale of tax exempt nonrecourse municipal bonds whose revenues are for private
purposes and whose benefits are derived from the Internal Revenue Code do not
violate WASH. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 5, 7. Neither these fiscal devices nor the operation
of the Internal Revenue Code were known to the framers.
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